What is the test for a ‘one man company’?

Singularis Holdings Ltd (In Official Liquidation) (A Company Incorporated in the Cayman Islands) (Respondent) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Ltd (Appellant) concerns whether the dishonest state of mind of the sole shareholder and a director of a company is attributable to the company for the purposes of a claim in negligence against a third party bank or broker and, if so, what the consequences are of that attribution. The appeal was heard by Lady Hale, Lord Reed, Lord Lloyd-Jones, Lord Sales and Lord Thomas last month. The appeal in relation to attribution raises the following questions (1) what is the test for a “one man company”? is it a company where every single shareholder and director is implicated in the fraud, irrespective of whether the directors were involved in the management of the company at any point in time; or a company that is wholly owned and controlled by a fraudulent sole shareholder and dominant director and/or by the only person involved in the management and ownership of the company? (2) upon whom does the burden of proof lie so far as the role of the other directors is concerned? does it lie upon the company on whose behalf the directors acted at the material time or upon the bank or broker? (3) in determining the question of attributionIs it relevant to consider whether the company had a legitimate business, and/or does the nature of the Quincecare duty lead to the conclusion that Mr Al Sanea’s fraudulent knowledge should not be attributed to the respondent? If Mr Al Sanea’s knowledge and fraudulent actions are attributable to the Respondent then the appeal raises a series of further questions.

These questions are (1) is the respondent’s claim defeated by lack of causation because the Quincecare duty does not extend to protecting the respondent from its own deliberate wrongdoing and/or because the respondent did not rely upon due performance of the Quincecare duty? (2) does the reasoning of Evans-Lombe J in Barings plc v Coopers & Lybrand (a firm) [2003] PNLR 34 apply where the respondent is primarily (as opposed to vicariously) liable for the actions of Mr Al Sanea? (3) how does the three stage test recently identified by the Supreme Court in Patel v Mirza [2016] 3 WLR 399 apply in this case? In particular: is the respondent’s claim contrary to public policy? does the existence of money laundering legislation and associated regulations provide a countervailing policy consideration in favour of allowing such a claim? would it be disproportionate to deny the claim because of the ability to make a deduction for contributory negligence on account of the respondent’s own contributory fault? The facts are that the appellant is the London subsidiary of a Japanese investment bank and brokerage firm. At the material time, the respondent was wholly owned by an individual called Maan Al Sanea (“Mr Al Sanea”), who was the company’s Chairman, President, Director and Treasurer.

Court of Appeal Opens the Door to LIBOR and Benchmark Misrepresentation Claims

Property Alliance Group Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2018] EWCA Civ 355 (02 March 2018)

Infamously, the London Inter-bank Offered Rate (LIBOR) used to be a code word for corruption in the world of finance. In more ways than one, it is still a dirty word from the point of view of ethics. However, even now, despite planning to phase it out by 2021 and replacing it with a proxy, the FCA calls LIBOR a “systemically important benchmark”. Property Alliance Group (PAG) appealed Asplin J’s decision to dismiss its claims against the Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) arising out of interest rate swap agreements. RBS advanced funds to PAG at interest rates referenced to LIBOR, which was published relying upon submissions from panels of banks on borrowing rates. These proceedings arose out of four swaps that RBS sold to PAG between 2004 and the spring of 2008. The first swap had a trade date of 6 October 2004 and a notional amount of £10 million. The second swap had a trade date of 25 September 2007 and a notional amount of £15 million for 4 years and then £30 million for a further six years. The third swap had a trade date of 14 January 2008 and a notional amount of £20 million. The fourth swap had a trade date of 16 April 2008 and a notional amount of £15 million. The global financial crisis of 2007-2008 trigged a fall in interest rates. All the swaps were tied to 3 month GBP LIBOR which plummeted and stayed low. The upshot was that the rates of interest that PAG was paying under the swaps far exceeded what it was receiving under them.

One consequence of the prolonged period of unusually low interest rates was that the swaps had a very large negative market-to-market value (MTM) from PAG’s point of view. The break cost incurred by PAG in 2011 was correspondingly substantial. PAG issued proceedings in 2013 seeking relief by way of rescission of the swaps and/or damages. The claims were divided into three categories: “the swaps claims”, which involved allegations of misrepresentation, misstatement and breach of contract on the part of RBS in connection with its proposal and sale of the swaps to PAG; “the LIBOR claims” which rested on RBS’s knowledge of and participation in manipulation of LIBOR rates; and “the GRG claims” by which PAG complained of breaches of contract arising out of its transfer to, and subsequent management within the controversial Global Restructuring Group to which RBS transferred its relationship with PAG in 2010. Asplin J dismissed the claims in their entirety. However, despite dismissing the onward appeal, light of the circumstances Sir Terence Etherton MR, Longmore and Newey LJJ were satisfied that RBS did make some representation to the effect that RBS itself was not manipulating and did not intend to manipulate LIBOR.

Supreme Court Clarifies the Law on Security and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitration Awards

IPCO (Nigeria) Ltd v Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation [2017] UKSC 16 (1 March 2017)

These proceedings involved the question whether the appellant Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) should have put up a further $100m security in English enforcement proceedings connected to a Nigerian arbitration award for $152,195,971 plus 5m Nigerian Naira plus interest at 14% per annum arising out of an agreement under which IPCO (Nigeria) Limited (IPCO) contracted to design and construct a petroleum export terminal for NPCC. The Supreme Court unanimously allowed the appeal. Giving the sole judgment, Lord Mance reversed the Court of Appeal’s decision and imparted much needed guidance on the provisions of the Arbitration Act 1996. He also said that rule 3.1(3) of the Civil Procedure Rules 1998 was not relevant to the appeal. The recognition and enforcement of foreign awards is addressed by sections 100-104 of Part III of the 1996 Act and these provisions implement the UK’s obligations under the New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 1958. Lord Mance explained that section 103, which sets out conditions for refusal of recognition of enforcement of awards under the Convention, was key to resolving this case. His Lordship construed the provision to hold that the court has no power to impose security when making orders under section 103(2) and section 103(3). Instead, only an order made under section 103(5) can be made conditional upon the provision of security by the award debtor.

IPCO is a turnkey contractor specialising in the construction of on-shore and offshore oil and gas facilities. The arbitration was conducted pursuant to a contract made in 1994 which was subject to Nigerian law and provided that disputes would be settled in accordance with the Nigerian Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1988. IPCO has been seeking to enforce the award in this jurisdiction since November 2004. In 2009, evidence tendered by a former IPCO employee enabled NPCC to challenge the entire award on the basis that IPCO inflated quantum by using fraudulent documentation. The English courts accept that NNPC has a good prima facie case regarding IPCO’s fraudulent behaviour and realistic prospects exist for the whole award to be set aside. NPCC’s challenges to the award are still pending in Nigeria for non-fraud and fraud reasons. Notably, however, NNPC’s application to amend its pleadings in the Nigerian proceedings to raise the fraud challenge was adjourned by consent and never determined.

Andrew Bailey on the Death of LIBOR

The ailing LIBOR benchmark, underpinning $500-$800 trillion worth of financial contracts, has been in a state of malaise for many years. Despite the efforts of regulators to revive the sick scandal-ridden benchmark, which suffered from a series of problems related to cheating and misreporting, it is unsurprising that its slow death will finally come in about four years’ time. As the Chief Executive of the FCA Andrew Bailey recently explained the funeral is set for 2021. But some clearly want LIBOR to live longer. Bailey called LIBOR “a public good” but questioned its current usefulness. Among other things, LIBOR related misconduct resulted in civil claims and fines of £9 billion. And, of course, in the criminal context it resulted in “clustered criminality” of which convicted LIBOR rigger Tom Hayes is a prime example. Clustered criminality, which only reflects a very small part of the ills affecting financial services, is when there “is at least strong suspicion that a crime has been committed and although the culprits may not be immediately clear it seems likely that more than one person was involved.” A succinct account of bankers lying, cheating and colluding to rig LIBOR is found in The Fix where Liam Vaughan and Gavin Finch expose the ills gripping the financial world. Hayes, who operated as “Tommy Chocolate” in the midst of the financial crisis, worked in a culture where “your performance metric” is all about “the edge” and making “a bit more money” because that is “how you are judged”.

In The Spider Network, David Enrich tells the “wild story” of Hayes – who he dubs “a maths genius” – and the backstabbing banking mafia which operated a thoroughly crooked financial system. Breaking the silence in an exclusive interview with The Sunday Times, Hayes’s wife Sarah Tighe vowed to “never stop fighting for my autistic husband, the LIBOR fall guy”. Hayes, who achieved notoriety by miraculously dodging extradition to the US, was jailed for 14 years for fraud but his sentence was reduced to 11 years. Tighe is fighting for her husband’s release and said that she “went apeshit” when officials tried to seize her assets as well. Her morale will undoubtedly be strengthened by the news that former Rabobank traders Anthony Allen and Anthony Conti, who are both British and were convicted at first instance for rigging LIBOR, have had their convictions overturned by the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in New York which found that constitutional rights against self-incrimination had been breached. Tom and Sarah will probably also find solace in the fact that the cycle of cheating was so extreme that even the Bank of England is now implicated in LIBOR manipulation.

Early Redemption of ‘Cocos’: Win for LBG in Supreme Court

BNY Mellon Corporate Trustee Services Ltd v LBG Capital No 1 Plc & Anor [2016] UKSC 29 (16 June 2016)

Almost like the British public on Brexit, the Supreme Court remained closely divided on the issue of whether the Court of Appeal erred in its construction of the terms of enhanced capital notes (ECNs) by relying on technical and specialist information as part of the factual matrix. Formally described as ECNs, the loan notes were contingent convertible securities (or “Cocos”). Lord Neuberger (with whom Lord Mance and Lord Toulson agreed) dismissed BNY Mellon’s appeal whereas Lord Sumption (with whom Lord Clarke agreed) would have done otherwise. As Lord Sumption said in his brief note of dissent, the case was “of considerable financial importance to the parties” but it raised “no questions of wider legal significance”. The outcome in the case is a major blow for investors (receiving up to 16pc interest) who had hoped that the court would not have held that the terms of the bonds (or ECNs) allowed Lloyds Banking Group (LBG) to redeem them early at face value. The High Court found in favour of the bondholders but the Court of Appeal reversed that decision, one that the Supreme Court has upheld: albeit not without doubts and dissent. Led by Mark Taber, the bondholders disputed that the ECNs had been disqualified as capital and resorted to litigation. A disgruntled Taber said that the division between the justices “raises massive issues over the role of the regulators”.

He is particularly aggrieved that the court’s judgment does not engage with the arguments aired about statutory requirements that bond prospectuses must be accurate and provide crystal clear information to investors so that they may make informed choices and decisions. Worse still Taber also complains that he lobbied the FCA’s new boss Andrew Bailey to make germane information – about the exact scope of the regulator and LBG’s knowledge about impending changes to capital requirements when the ECNs were issued – available to the court. But since his request was not granted, he argues that because the courts are not willing to intervene it must be the City regulator’s job to interpret the prospectuses. “I believe the changes they knew about, which were not disclosed in the ECN prospectus, meant that a capital disqualification event was a certainty at the time the ECNs were issued. If the court had been told this I think it would have made a difference,” is how Taber expressed his frustration with the situation. However, his claim appears to directly contradict even Lord Sumption’s dissenting judgment that despite its financial importance the appeal contained no legally significant questions of wider importance.

“Land Banks” and Collective Investment Schemes: Supreme Court on s.235, FSMA

Asset Land Investment Plc & Anor v The Financial Conduct Authority [2016] UKSC 17 (20 April 2016)

The Financial Conduct Authority is in the news a lot these days. Andrew Bailey has been handpicked to head the agency but the chancellor George Osborne has come under fire for making the appointment without conducting a formal interview, thereby sidestepping the two candidates (Tracey McDermott and Greg Medcraft from Down Under) formally on the shortlist. However, the beleaguered FCA chairman John Griffith-Jones agreed with outgoing chief executive McDermott and both of them were “happy” with the chancellor’s appointment of Bailey – a beefy looking BoE insider who impressively holds a doctorate in economic history. As seen in the last post, Panama has been in the news a lot. The FCA had originally given 20 banks until 15 April 2016 to report on the extent, if any, of their involvement and links with Mossack Fonseca or firms serviced by them. But now it warns that prosecutions over the Panama Papers are not clear-cut. According to Mark Steward, head of enforcement, the media frenzy is “quite different from prosecutions – the two don’t necessarily go together”. This case involved a Panamanian corporation called Asset LI Inc trading as Asset Land Investment plc against which the FCA brought proceedings for carrying on “regulated activities” without authorisation contrary to the general prohibition in section 19 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. Schemes for investing in land with development potential are commonly known as “land banks” and the operation of such initiatives first came into the regulatory perimeter under section 11 of the PERG Manual of the FCA Handbook.  

In Financial Services Authority v Fradley [2005] EWCA Civ 1183, the Court of Appeal had described the drafting of section 235 (collective investment schemes) of FSMA as “open-textured” by virtue of which words such as “arrangements” and “property of any description” are to be given “a wide meaning”. Arden LJ found in Fradley that section 235 must not be construed so as to include matters which are not fairly within it because contravening section 19 may result in the commission of criminal offences, subject to section 23(3) of FSMA. Lord Carnwath of Notting Hill found her Ladyship’s approach to be “helpful guidance”. On the other hand, he remained cautious of drawing analogies from comparative Commonwealth legislation presented to the court – such as the Australian Corporations Act 2001 – on the ground that differences in drafting warranted keeping the discussion strictly within the boundaries of UK statutes and authorities. Like the first instance judge, the Supreme Court referred to the English and the Panamanian company indiscriminately as “Asset Land”.

Supreme Court on the ‘Houdini Taxpayer’

UBS AG & Deutsche Bank v Revenue and Customs [2016] UKSC 13 (9 March 2016)

As infamously explained by jailed fraudster Tom Hayes, UBS must be credited with issuing a “handbook” on rigging LIBOR. Doubling Hayes up, in the ongoing LIBOR trial, Jonathan Mathew, one of five charged Barclays traders, says that he was merely following orders and just did what his boss taught/told him to do. The five men say everyone in the big banks “knew LIBOR was rigged”. As seen in an earlier post, along with Barclays traders, Deutsche Bank traders are facing criminal charges for EURIBOR manipulation and proceedings are ongoing in the case of R v Christian Bittar & Ors – first appearances were made at Westminster Magistrates’ Court on 11 January 2016 and a mention hearing was held on 18 March 2016. Former Deutsche trader Martyn Dodgson has also been convicted for insider trading in Operation Tabernula. In the instant case, echoing Templeman LJ in W T Ramsay Ltd v Inland Revenue Comrs [1979] 1 WLR 974, Lord Reed described UBS and Deutsche Bank’s behaviour as “the most sophisticated attempts of the Houdini taxpayer to escape from the manacles of tax.” The banks, which Lord King calls “the Achilles heel of capitalism”, may be disappointed with the Supreme Court’s ruling but most people will only be too delighted that top executives should become acquainted with some degree of retributive justice. The dry issue of tax is a hot political topic these days and the Panama Papers (see here) culminated in calls for the prime minister to resign for being a hypocrite.

Though this post is about the Supreme Court’s judgment, I use the opportunity to discursively expose other important tax issues reported in the media. Of course, Deutsche Bank announced last October that it would axe 9,000 full-time jobs and it has just recent lost its global position as a top-three investment bank. Research from Coalition, that ranks global investment banks by total revenue from fees and trading, shows that Citigroup and Bank of America are ahead of Deutsche Bank. JPMorgan Chase and Goldman Sachs retained their positions in first and second place respectively. Tim Wallace writes in today’s The Sunday Telegraph that once a cash cow, investment banking is now is serious crisis and jobs and pay across the sector has declined. It is a vicious cycle and the following insightful analogy is invoked “shrinking an investment bank is hard. It is like unravelling a jumper – once you start pulling on the thread it is hard to stop … then all of a sudden, you haven’t got a jumper at all.”

Catalyst for Change: Towards a Model of Conduct Costs in Pakistan

Reposted from the Conduct Costs Pakistan Blog which I have recently started. As measured by the CCP Research Foundation, in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers seven years ago, global “conduct costs” are approaching stratospheric levels and are presently estimated to be $300 billion. But none of the data reflected in the final sum can be traced to Pakistan – a market economy whose legal system closely resembles the English legal system, despite the politically retrograde Islamisation of the 1980s – in clear and unambiguous terms. This blog is written with the ambition of articulating a conduct costs’ model in Pakistan, a developing country which is in need of such analysis so that its 192 million people are put in a position to make informed choices about banking and financial services.

In constitutional terms, a sound basis for the study of conduct costs can be found in Articles 37 and 38 of the Constitution of Pakistan 1973. Laid down in Part II: Fundamental Rights and Principles of Policy, Chapter 2: Principles of Policy of the Constitution, Article 37 requires the state to promote social justice and Article 38 imposes on the state a duty to promote the people’s social and economic well-being. On an alternative level, in The End of Alchemy, Professor Mervyn King relies on all his experience as a central banker to explain the wider dynamics of the global economy. He invites us to embrace the underlying theoretical argument that banks are “the Achilles heel of capitalism”. This attractive proposition is as advantageous a place to begin a study of the banks in Pakistan as it is in the west.

Supreme Court: Corporate Raids and the Proper Purpose Rule

Eclairs Group Ltd and Glengary Overseas Ltd v JKX Oil & Gas plc [2015] UKSC 71 (2 December 2015)

In a judgment which may at first blush appear to be unremarkable, Lord Neuberger, Lord Mance, Lord Clarke, Lord Sumption and Lord Hodge held that the proper purpose rule applied to the exercise of the power conferred on the board – allowing it to issue a “restriction notice” whenever a statutory disclosure notice had been issued and had not been complied with – under article 42 of JKX’s articles of association and that the company’s directors acted for an improper purpose. Notably, section 793 of the Companies Act 2006 provides a public company the power to issue a statutory disclosure notice to any person whom it knows or reasonably believes to be interested in its shares. According to the Supreme Court, in circumstances where a company’s board of directors was entitled under the company’s articles of association to issue a disclosure notice against a shareholder and where the board was further entitled – in the event that they knew or had reasonable cause to believe that the statements given in response were incorrect – to restrict the shareholder’s right to attend or vote at any general meeting of the company, any such restriction would be invalid if the board’s purpose in making the restriction had been to prevent the shareholder voting at the meeting.

Lord Sumption gave the main judgment and Lord Hodge agreed with him. Lord Mance and Lord Neuberger agreed that the appeals should be allowed, but they preferred to not to express a view on aspects of the reasoning. Moreover, Lord Clarke agreed, but expressed a preference to defer a final conclusion on those aspects until they arise for decision and have been fully argued. Prior to this decision, the case had been reported in the Court of Appeal as [2014] Bus LR 835 and in the High Court as [2014] Bus LR 18. JKX Oil & Gas Plc, an English company listed on the London Stock Exchange, was the parent company of a group involved the development and exploitation of oil and gas reserves, primarily in Russia and the Ukraine. From that perspective, Lord Sumption used the opportunity to apply his unrivalled expertise on both company law and Russia to the present case. The exercise of a discretionary power by directors tends to be challenged on the ground that it does not promote the success of the company, a subjective question as regards the company’s business interests.

Raytheon Systems: e-Borders Arbitration Set Aside for ‘Serious Irregularity’

See my article  Failure to Deal with the Issues: The e-Borders Award and ‘Serious Irregularity’ under the Arbitration Act 1996. These judgments given by Akenhead J relate to the e-Borders controversy. The e-Borders passenger information system was marketed as a one-stop solution to the UK’s immigration and security problems. Under e-Borders the Home Office sought to create an electronic system to examine everyone entering and exiting the UK by verifying their details against immigration, police and security related watch lists. In Raytheon Systems Ltd [2014] EWHC 4375 (TCC), Akenhead J set aside an arbitral award (in e-Borders contractor Raytheon’s favour) because of “serious irregularity” within the meaning of section 68(2)(d) of the Arbitration Act 1996 (“the 1996 Act”). In December 2014, the court held that the arbitration tribunal failed to deal with all the issues (of fault and responsibility attributable to Raytheon which were highly relevant to quantum) put to it. Subsequently, in Raytheon Systems Ltd [2015] EWHC 311 (TCC), in February 2015, Akenhead J set the arbitration award (£200+ million) aside in its entirety for serious irregularity and ordered a fresh hearing.

The arbitrators’ identities remain undisclosed to the public and the rulings did not intend to reflect on their integrity or general competence. Despite successfully challenging the award in court, the government continued to negotiate and the Home Secretary announced on 27 March 2015 that the settlement with Raytheon was “a full and final payment of £150m.” The earlier judgments, in the Home Office’s favour, were made publicly available in February 2015 and are perhaps the only authoritative documents in the public domain that shed light on the dispute. The award was set aside for serious irregularity because of the arbitrators’ failure to address issues, highly relevant to quantum, of fault and responsibility attributable to Raytheon. Signed in 2007, the e-Borders contract was worth around £750 million in total. The government terminated it in 2010 because of delays and key milestones being missed.