SFO v Standard Bank: First UK Deferred Prosecution Agreement

7 12 2015

The director of the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), David Green QC, has overseen a turnaround in the ailing agency’s fortunes. Green is reportedly paid £175,000 annually and the press suggests he is likely to continue his role for another two years after his four-year term expires in April 2016. With successes such as the conviction of benchmark fraudster Tom Hayes (presently jailed in Lowdham Grange Prison) already under his belt, Green has his sights set on securing further convictions in other ongoing benchmark prosecutions. In Hayes’s appeal, Sir John Thomas LCJ has directed that a medical report should be filed by 9 December 2015. Hayes argued the Nuremberg defence and said that he was merely following orders. But he failed miserably in winning the jury’s sympathy and is a broken man. He suffers from Asperger’s syndrome and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder but that did not stop Sir Jeremy Cooke from sentencing him to 14 years’ imprisonment for his fraudulent ways. Of course, only recently the SFO also secured the UK’s first deferred prosecution agreement (DPA). In SFO v Standard Bank Plc, the president of the Queen’s Bench Division, Sir Brain Leveson approved the UK’s first DPA in a bribery case connected to a £397/$600 million sovereign note deal involving Tanzania.

Two things stand out about this case. It is the first example of a UK prosecutor entering into a DPA or a “plea deal”. Moreover, the situation was equally novel because it was the very first time that the offence of failing to prevent bribery – under section 7 of the Bribery Act – was used since its introduction in 2010. The government considers DPAs as a new and important enforcement tool to deal with corporate economic crime. DPAs came into existence in the UK by virtue of section 45 and schedule 17 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013. The present case turned on the Tanzanian government’s wish to raise funds by way of a sovereign note private placement. The bribe took place when, in March 2013, Standard Bank’s former sister firm Stanbic Bank Tanzania paid £4/$6 million to Enterprise Growth Market Advisers (EGMA). The SFO contended that the improper payment’s purpose was to induce a representative of the Tanzanian government to favour Standard Bank and Stanbic’s proposal for the sovereign note deal. Stanbic and Standard Bank shared the transaction fees of £5.6/$8.4 million that were generated by the placement. Read the rest of this entry »





Supreme Court: The Meaning of “Criminal Property” in POCA 2002

2 05 2015

R v GH (Respondent) [2015] UKSC 24, 22 April 2015

The Supreme Court (Lord Neuberger PSC and Lord Kerr, Lord Reed, Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson JJSC) heard this case on appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeal (Lloyd Jones LJ, Irwin and Green JJ) reported at [2013] EWCA Crim 2237. Unanimously allowing the appeal of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP), giving the only judgment Lord Toulson held at para 47 that the “character of the money did change on being paid into the respondent’s accounts.” This case involved fraud which had been perpetrated through the Internet via four “ghost” websites falsely pretending to offer cut-price motor insurance. To execute his plans, B used associates who opened bank accounts for transmitting the proceeds generated by the scam and H was an associate of this nature. A ghost website in the name of AM Insurance was operated from 1 September 2011 to January 2012. Before the site became live online, two bank accounts, in Lloyds Bank and Barclays Bank, were opened by H and B subsequently took control of these accounts and bank cards linked to them. The Supreme Court held that section 328 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) does not require property to constitute criminal property before an arrangement came into operation because such a construction is likely have serious potential consequences in relation to banks and other financial institutions.

The public was swindled into paying £417,709 into the Lloyds’ account and £176,434 into the Barclays’ account for insurance cover that did not exist. Charged under section 328(1) – i.e. entering into or becoming concerned in an arrangement which he knew or suspected would facilitate the retention, use or control of criminal property, namely the money received into the accounts, by or on behalf of B – H was tried in the Central Criminal Court. To the jury, the DPP articulated its case on the premise that whilst H may not have known the details of B’s fraud, the circumstances in which the accounts were opened pointed to H’s knowledge (or at least suspicion) that B had some criminal purpose. Yet Recorder Greenberg QC held that no criminal property existed at the point in time H entered into the arrangement and that H therefore had no case to answer. Read the rest of this entry »